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My misgivings about applying were somewhat allayed when I learnt from the then current incumbent, Brian Davenport, that the tradition was to appoint someone who knew nothing at all about tax. On that basis I considered myself well-qualified for the job, and presumably so did the Attorney-General Michael Havers who was kind enough to appoint me. The logic apparently was that such a person would come to the job with no prejudices or pre-conceptions about the tax laws in question, and would thus be better able to act as the innocent mouthpiece for the Revenue.
As I also quickly discovered, this might sometimes result in innocence being thrown into the lion's den. I vividly remember my first encounter with Walton J, who not only knew quite a lot about tax, but was not known for mincing his words. His judgment in Donnelly v Williamson 2 , was a classic demonstration of both qualities. I was the unfortunate recipient.
In terms of the statute it was about the meaning of that elusive word "emoluments" in the context of schedule E. The taxpayer was a teacher who used to travel by car to attend certain out of school functions, and was paid by the authority a small mileage allowance.
Was that taxable as an emolument from the employment? The General Commissions had said no. But apparently the Revenue thought it a point of sufficient general importance to justify an appeal. So apparently did the NUT who instructed leading counsel to represent the taxpayer. Unfortunately, the actual amounts involved for the two years in question were not substantial. The judge was unimpressed. The opening words of his judgment are etched in my memory:
"Believe it or not, this appeal by the Crown is in respect of tax at the basic rate on a sum of £13… This is not merely a case of taking a sledge hammer to crack a nut; it effectively ensures that the nut itself, and a good deal more will wholly disappear in the operation…. The… justification (offered) is that this is a test 3 case; I presume that if that is so it is fairly representative of the whole class of cases… Thus the wholly uncomfortable feeling is left with the public at large that the Crown spends so much time and effort persecuting minnows that it is small wonder that it has no energy left to pursue the real sharks…"
It will not surprise you to hear that the Revenue lost the case and did not appeal.
For the purpose of this lecture the case can also be used to illustrate a more general point about tax law. Much of it has a very long history -in some cases dating back 100 years and more. It has a propensity for ordinary English words -like "emoluments" in that case -to develop a life of their own by the process of judicial interpretation over years - I found myself having to spend most of a nice summer weekend getting up to speed on a subject of which I knew nothing. That involved reading into a long succession of authorities, dating back to the leading case of Yarmouth v France (1887) L.R. 19 QBD 647.
That, you will recall, was not a tax case but was under the Employers Liability Act 1880.
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It was held (somewhat improbably) that a cart-owner's horse was "plant", and its vicious nature a "defect" in the plant, such as to make him liable under the Act to his employee whose leg was broken by a kick from the horse. Although no doubt justifiable as a purposive interpretation in its context, it turned out to be a bad start for the clarity of the concept when introduced into tax law. I found not much more assistance in the most recent modern authority, Benson v Yard Arm Club Ltd [1981] STC 266, where a floating restaurant was held not to qualify as plant, because it was said to be the setting in which the business took place.
I struggled to find any common theme in all these cases, let alone relate it to the task in hand. I was relieved in due course not only that we won the case, but to see my misgivings about the interpretative process echoed in the concurring judgment of
Stephenson LJ:
"What is plant?... Parliament has not attempted to put an end, or a limit, to (the) litigation by defining plant. Many judges have made the attempt. The more definitions multiply, the less enviable grows the task of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Taxes. If they 'traverse the whole gamut of reported cases' crossing the border into Scotland and the seas to Australia in their search for guidance, they find plant in the most unlikely objects, from a horse to a swimming pool, from a dry dock to a mural decoration... The philosopher-statesman, Balfour, is reported to have said it was unnecessary to define a Great Power because, like an elephant, you recognised it when you met it. Unhappily plant in taxing and other statutes is no elephant (though I suppose an elephant might be plant). It has lost what resemblance to machinery it may once have had and any contrast with buildings or structures is now misleading, however strong the temptation to go back to those simple similarities and differences which the word might have suggested before repeated difficulties of application drove judges to gloss them over…" . Famously Lehman Brothers had become commercially insolvent due to the worldwide crash of the international group of companies of which it formed an important part. To some surprise the winding-up generated an unprecedented surplus after payment of all provable debts, in the region of £7 billion, of which some £5 billion was estimated to be payable by way of statutory interest under the winding-up rules. Was this "yearly interest" so as to require tax to be deducted on payment by the liquidators?
As Lord Briggs said in his judgment the appeal concerned "the relationship between two statutory provisions, one very old and the other very young": "The old provision, which dates back to the inception of Income Tax during the Napoleonic Wars,.. requires a debtor in specific circumstances to deduct income tax from payments of 'yearly interest' arising in the United Kingdom. The young provision, first made the subject of legislation in 1986…, requires a surplus remaining after payment of debts proved in a distributing administration first to be applied in paying interest on those debts in respect of the periods during which they had been outstanding since the commencement of the administration…." "… a guiding principle must underlie any interpretation of the Act, namely, that its purpose is to tax capital gains and to make allowance for For me that case was the beginning of something of a love/hate relationship with Ramsay which has followed my career through to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.
My heart was with judges like Templeman and Diplock who saw no problem in developing the law to stamp out an obvious abuse; my head was never far from those who struggled to find an intellectually defensible basis for doing so, within the legitimate boundaries of the judicial process of statutory interpretation.
It was apparent from what followed that I was not alone. As I was to observe in a case in no commercial (business) purpose apart from the avoidance of a liability to taxnot "no business effect". If those two ingredients exist, the inserted steps are to be disregarded for fiscal purposes. The court must then look at the end result.
Precisely how the end result will be taxed will depend on the terms of the taxing statute sought to be applied."
Subsequent cases struggled to work out the conceptual basis of the principle -was it a conventional application of purposive statutory construction (as, for example, Lord Steyn argued) or something more, and if so what, and how far did it go? To me at least it seemed clear that it could not be explained by reference simply to statutory interpretation. It had to be something more, because it involved not just interpreting the statute in a purposive way, but reinterpreting the facts. One had to pretend that the intervening steps, though admittedly effective in "business" terms, had not happened.
I came back to it again as a judge in the Chancery Division in 1997 a case called "commercial" and "legal" concepts, one touchstone apparently being whether a commercial man would say of a statutory expression "You had better ask a lawyer" (see [2001] Furniss, as illustrations of "commercial" concepts, in the sense he used the term, and as therefore susceptible to Ramsay analysis. However, in each case, there seems a strong case for regarding the statutory concept as one of law, or certainly one on which a commercial man would look to a lawyer for advice."
We were however agreed that in this particular case the taxpayer the statutory scheme gave no room for the application of the Ramsay principle, and the taxpayer should succeed.
The House of Lords took a similar view. Unusually their decision was given in a unanimous "report" (delivered by Lord Nicholls) rather than individual speeches, and not surprisingly its reasoning has an element of compromise. It has rightly been treated since then as a definitive statement of the principle and its limits. Although Lord
Hoffmann was a party to the decision, it skirted delicately round his commercial/legal divide. That was described as "a not unreasonable generalisation", but "not intended to provide a substitute for a close analysis of what the statute means" (para 38).
Similarly, while paying lip-service to the theory that it was an exercise in statutory interpretation, the report qualified that by adopting the pithy reformulation by Ribeiro This introduced the new "General Anti-Abuse Rule" designed in terms to counteract tax arrangements deemed to be "abusive". Tax arrangements are defined by reference to whether "having regard to all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to conclude that the obtaining of a tax advantage is the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangements". "Abusive" is defined by reference to whether the arrangements are "a reasonable course of action in relation to the relevant tax provisions", having regard to A notable effect of the proliferation of "navigational aids" and "sign posts" was to make the statutes much longer. This became evident to us in Derry. As far as I am aware this is the first time the highest court has had to consider the correct approach to a Rewrite Statute.
The issue was the relevant year for a claim to for share loss relief. We attempted faithfully to follow the course mapped out by the Income Taxes Act, starting from the "Overview of the Act" in section 2, through the "7 steps" for the calculation of income tax liability under section 23, step 2 of which pointed us to the deduction of reliefs under section 24; and thence on to Part 4 ("loss reliefs") with its own "Overview", and finally at last to sections 131-2 (share loss relief), with (in case we had forgotten) their own signpost back again calculation of tax liability in step 2 of section 23.
That all seemed tolerably clear and (with time) easy enough to follow. However, the Revenue argued that we should not stop there. To find out the relevant tax year, they said, we needed to go to schedule 1B of the Taxes Management Act (headed "claims for loss relief involving two or more years"). They admitted that there was no specific signpost in that direction (as there was in respect of other forms of loss relief), but they took us to the very end of the ITA s 1020 which says "For further information about claims and elections see TMA 1970…"
In disagreement with the Court of Appeal, we did not think that was good enough. I said:
"Having taken such care to walk the taxpayer through the process of giving effect to his entitlement as part of his tax liability for the year specified by him, it would seem extraordinary for that to be taken away, without any direct reference or signpost, by a provision in a relatively obscure Schedule of another statute concerned principally, not with liability, but with management of the tax. Section 1020 makes no specific reference to Schedule 1B, and in any event refers only to "information" in general terms, rather than anything likely to affect the substance of liability…"
The only countervailing consideration was that there was no obvious reason for -and nothing in the previous statutes to indicate -a difference in this respect between share loss relief, and other forms of relief which were in terms made subject to schedule 1B.
But we thought that:
"for the taxpayer's liability to be determined by reference to legal archaeology of this kind would negate the whole purpose of the tax law rewrite…"
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I have not seen any academic commentary on that aspect of our judgment. I do not get the impression that it has disturbed the dovecotes particularly, but I would be very interested to hear other views on the success or otherwise of the project.
As an own experiment of my own for this lecture, I wondered what had happened to the concept which had caused me such discomfort back in 1981 in Donnelly v Willamson. As you will recall under ICTA 1970 income tax under schedule E was charged on the "the emoluments" from the employment, the expression "emoluments" being defined as including "all salaries, fees, wages, perquisites and profits whatsoever".
The 1970 with what benefits in clarity? The overview (s 1) tells us that "employment income" is dealt with in parts 2 to 7. Part 2 starts with section 3 which tells us about the "structure of the employment income parts", including part 3 which is going to tell us what are "earnings". On the way we pass by section 7 which tells us helpfully that "employment income" means "earnings within Chapter 1 of Part 3, any amount treated as earnings (see subsection (3) and any amount which counts as employment income (see subsection 6)".
When eventually we get to Part 3 we find in section 62 a definition of earnings, which is in more familiar albeit more elaborate terms:
"earnings", in relation to an employment, means-(a) any salary, wages or fee, (b) any gratuity or other profit or incidental benefit of any kind obtained by the employee if it is money or money's worth, or (c) anything else that constitutes an emolument of the employment."
So, in a sense we have come full circle -and back to our old friend emoluments. To decide what that means, it may be difficult to avoid going back to the previous case-law.
In conclusion, one may legitimately ask: has the rewrite made the concept simpler and easier for the ordinary taxpayer to understand? Or in the words of one well-seasoned observer has the clearer wording "simply meant that you understood better why you did not understand it?" I am afraid I am not qualified to answer those questions. However, for my own part, even with those navigational aids, I needed quite a lot of help finding my way round the new statute. I would have found it a tortuous and frustrating task if I had to rely only on the signposts in the Act. I was much helped by reference to some excellent modern textbooks, but also of course to aids which were not around when the project was conceived. A Google search for employment income takes one quickly to HMRC and other guidance on the issue, with hyperlink references to more detailed materials. In the light of that experience I suspect that the modern path to enlightenment may be not through rewritten statutes, however skilfully done. Even with those aids, and as I near the end of my judicial career, I am forced to admit that-in fiscal matters as in so many other aspects of life -true "enlightenment" (at least in the Buddhist sense) is still a long way off.
.
